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UNITED STATES V. AM. LIBRARY ASS'N
539 U.S. 194 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant, the United States, appealed the final judgment of a
three-judge panel of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, which held that the Children's Internet Protection
Act ("CIPA") was facially unconstitutional. Appellees, American
Library Association ("ALA"),
several regional library
associations, Web publishers and library patrons sued the United
States challenging the constitutionality of CIPA's filtering
provisions.'
Appellees brought this challenge based on two
claims. First, they alleged that CIPA's filtering provisions violated
the First Amendment.'
Second, Appellees alleged that CIPA
placed "unconstitutional conditions" on the receipt of federal
funds.3
II. BACKGROUND

Public libraries receive federal financial assistance to help them
provide Internet access to their patrons.4 The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 established the E-Rate program, which enables public
libraries to purchase Internet access at rates below the competitive
price. ' Libraries also receive federal financial assistance pursuant
to the Library Services Technology Act ("LSTA"), which enables
the Institute of Museum and Library Services to provide grants to
libraries to "assis[t] libraries in accessing information through
electronic networks."6 Using these programs, libraries have
1. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 199.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Library
9141(a)(1)(C) (2003)).
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succeeded in providing Internet access to their patrons.7 In 2000,
95 percent of the country's libraries supplied Internet access to the
public
While the Internet access provided by public libraries allows
library patrons access to a wealth of educational, cultural, and
creative material, it also provides easy access to online
pornography.'
Once Congress realized that library patrons,
including children, used library computers to access online
pornography, sometimes viewed nonconsensually by other patrons
who saw the images left on the computer screen or at library
printers, Congress contemplated a remedy to the situation.
Believing that the E-rate program and LSTA grants were
facilitating access to the pornography, Congress enacted CIPA.
CIPA amended the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
Library Services and Technology Act to require that public
libraries have "a policy of Internet safety for minors that includes
the operation of a technology protection measure ...that protects
against access" by children and adults to "visual depictions" that
are "harmful to minors.""' The Act defines a "technology
protection measure" as "a specific technology that blocks or filters
Internet access to material covered by [CIPA]". 1 ' CIPA allows
libraries to disable the filters allowing patrons to access
pornographic material for legitimate research or other lawful
purposes. 2 However, the E-rate and LSTA programs provide
different guidelines for when the library is allowed to disable the
filter. 3 The E-rate program allows disabling "during use by any
7. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 199.
8. Id. (citing J. Bertot & C. McClure, PublicLibraries and the Internet 2000:
Summary Findings and Data Tables, 3 (Sept. 7, 2000) available at
http://nclis.gov/statusru/2000plo.pdf (last visited November 4, 2004).
9. Id. (citing Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419

(E.D. Pa. 2002)).
10. Id. (citing Library Services Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i) (2003); Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§
254(h)(6)(B)(i) and (C)(i) (2002)).
11. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I)).
12. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 9134(0(3); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D)).
13. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 201.
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adult," whereas the LSTA program permits disabling during use
by any person. 4
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc. the United
States Supreme Court considered whether a statute that makes the
receipt of public funds contingent on the requirement that public
libraries install filters that block pornographic images or oino;
images harmful to minors is facially unconstitutional. 5 Following
a complete trial, the district court held that CIPA was
unconstitutional on its face and enjoined the relevant agencies
from enforcing it. 6 Specifically, the district court held that the
filtering mechanism constituted a content-based restriction on
access to a public forum, which required strict scrutiny.' 7 The
district court found that libraries made the affirmative decision to
provide patrons with Internet access, and it necessarily made
accessible a limitless array of topics, speakers, and viewpoints.' 8 It
reasoned that libraries provided Internet access for the public to be
used in "expressive activity." 9 The court subsequently held that
the filter is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict
scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional." Reviewing the district
court's decision de novo, the Supreme Court found, contrary to the
district court, that the Internet access provided by public libraries
does not constitute a public forum, allowing the Court to employ a
rational basis review.2' Based on this review, the Court concluded
that the filters' content-based restrictions established by CIPA are
constitutional, since the government has broad discretion in

14. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2002); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3)

(2003)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at202.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 202.
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 205.
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deciding what private speech to make available to the public.22
A. CIPA is a valid use of Congress' spendingpower because it
does not induce librariesto violate the FirstAmendment
The Court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the
Internet filter provisions of the E-rate and LSTA programs by
recognizing that Congress has significant freedom to attach
conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in its effort to
promote its goals.23 The Court also pointed out that Congress may
not use conditions to induce the recipient of the funds to carry out
acts that would be unconstitutional if the recipient were to behave
in the same manner itself, independent of the Congressional
action. 4 In order to determine if the condition on which Congress
places the receipt of funds violates the First Amendment, the Court
looked at the role of libraries in our society.25
The Court examined the role of libraries as a method for
determining the broader and more significant question: whether a
public library rises to the level of a public forum and, as such,
would require that strict scrutiny be used to review any of its
content-based judgments. 26 The Court praised the libraries'
valuable mission of "facilitating learning and cultural enrichment,"
however it disagreed with the district court's conclusion that this
important mission creates a public forum. 27 The district court
offered, in support of its public forum finding, ALA's "Library2
Bill of Rights," also known as its "Freedom to Read Statement.
The Library Bill of Rights states that libraries shall provide
"[b]ooks and other... resources for the interest, information, and

22. Id. at 204.
23. Id. at 203.
24. Id.
25. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 203.

26. Id. at 202-03.
27. Id. at 203.
28. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419 (E.D. Pa.

2002).
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enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves. 29
However, the Court emphasized that the library's goal of
collecting and providing materials that best suit the needs and
interests of the community necessitates that the library use
discretion and make content-based decisions in its selection
process.3 ° This broad discretion to make the necessary contentbased judgments regarding the material that libraries provide their
patrons is not congruous with the notion of a public forum, which
does not allow for such content-based distinctions.3
Based on its examination of the general role of libraries, the
Court refused to extend the public forum principles to Internet
access in public libraries.32 The Court explained that the Internet
access at issue here is neither a "traditional" nor "designated"
public forum.33 The Court previously has refused to extend the
status of a traditional public forum "beyond its historical
confines."34 The Court also declined to give libraries the status of
"designated" public forum because the Internet has not
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.. .for
purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."35 In order for Internet
access provided by a public library to constitute a "designated"
public forum, the government must affirmatively offer its property
as a forum for public discourse. 6 The Court concluded that the
government had not offered its property, in the context of Internet
access at public libraries, for the purpose of public discourse. 7
29. Am. Library Ass',
Supp. 2d at 420).

539 U.S. at 204 (citing Am. Library Ass'., 201 F.

30. Id. at 204-05.
31. Id. at205.
32. Id. at 206.
33. Id. at 205 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed Fund, Inc.,

473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (describing the different types of forums)).
34. Id. at 205 (quoting Arkansas Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 678 (1998)).
35. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 205 (quoting Int'l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)).
36. Id. at 206 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-803).
37. Id. at 206.
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The Court distinguished the instant case from Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., which the district court viewed
as analogous to the current facts.38 In Rosenberger, the University
of Virginia excluded a student religious publication from using
resources from the "Student Activity Fund" which was intended to
subsidize student publications. 39 There, the Court held that the
Fund created a limited public forum because it provided financial
resources to student groups wishing to express their views and
ideas via student publications, and could therefore not discriminate
based on the viewpoint of the publication.4"
The Court
distinguished the instant case from Rosenberger by asserting that
public libraries do not provide Internet access for the purpose of
providing a public forum for Web site authors and publishers to
express themselves, but rather to simply make information
available to its patrons." The Court further explained that a public
libraries' Internet access does not exist to "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers," as did the "Student Activity Fund"
42 Instead, the Internet access serves the same
in Rosenberger.
purpose as libraries' books, namely, enabling research, learning
and recreation by making the appropriate materials available.43
The Internet is simply a newer technological medium for accessing
the same type of information."
Appellees argued, and the district court agreed, that although
public libraries have broad discretion in their selection of print
material and they affirmatively choose to acquire every book, the
same does not and cannot apply to the Internet because of the
vastness of the material on the Web.45 The Court, however, did not
find the technological distinction between books and the Internet
38. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 206-07.
42. Id. at 206 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 834).
43. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805).
44. Id. at 207.
45. Id. at 207-08.
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to be constitutionally significant. 46 The Court reiterated that a
library's discretion and ability to make content-based collection
decisions depends on its original role and purpose: to identify
quality material appropriate to the interests and needs of the
community.47 The library's discretion does not, as the Appellees
and the district court suggest, turn on the medium of the material
made available. 48 The Court pointed out that most public libraries
already exclude print pornography as part of their broad
discretion.49 Therefore, it would not be rational to provide
different standards for a library's ability to exclude online
pornography, since whatever the medium of the pornography, a
library's decision to exclude is for the same reason."
Based on the Court's conclusion that Internet access provided by
a public library does not constitute a public forum, it was also able
to dispose of the district court's critique that the filtering software
significantly overblocks content." Both the district court and the
dissent noted that because of the limits of the software, it
necessarily blocks significantly more than the type of speech that
is intended to be blocked as prescribed by the statute. 2
Specifically, the software relies on text and not images to block
Web sites and because of that technological limitation, "many
erroneously blocked [Web] pages contain content that is
completely innocuous for both adults and minors, and that no
rational person could conclude matches the filtering companies'
category definitions, such as 'pornography' or 'sex'. '"" This is a
significant critique of the filtering mechanism behind CIPA
because it provides the basis for the district court's conclusion that
CIPA is not narrowly tailored. Both the district court and the

46. Id. at 208
47. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 208.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 208-09.
52. Id. at 221.
53. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 208-209 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n, 201
F. Supp. 2d at 449).
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dissent reason that since the software through which CIPA is
carried out cannot limit its content-based judgments to the
appropriate content, it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 4
The Court attacked the dissent's critique on two fronts. First,
the Court called attention to the fact libraries can unblock specific
Web sites or even disable the filter at the request of a patron.5 The
Court noted that a patron need only ask the librarian for the
filtering to be disabled to "enable access for bona fide research or
other lawful purposes."56 The Government explained at trial that
the patron would not have to indicate to the librarian why he
wished the site to be unblocked. 7 The dissent argued that
requiring a patron to ask the librarian to unblock the Web site may
cause embarrassment such that patrons will not actually utilize the
unblocking, and constitutionally protected speech will remain
blocked. However, the Court dismissed this argument because
the Constitution does not guarantee citizens will be free from
embarrassment in the pursuit of constitutionally protected speech. 9
More importantly, the Court's analysis was not based on strict
scrutiny and therefore did not require that the content-based
restriction be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
objective.60
Therefore, some overblocking of constitutionally
protected speech is permissible, especially given that patrons can
ask the librarian to unblock the relevant Web sites.6

B. CIPA does not unconstitutionallycondition receipt offunds on

54. Id.
55. Id. at 209.
56. Id. at 209 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (disabling allowed for both
minors and adults); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (disabling allowed only for
adults)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 209
59. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 209.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Id. at 209.
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the installationoffilters that limit access to constitutionally
protectedspeech
Appellees also argued that CIPA imposes an unconstitutional
condition on the receipt of the E-rate and LSTA subsidies.62
Specifically, Appellees asserted that CIPA requires libraries to
forego their right to provide their patrons access to constitutionally
protected speech, as protected by the First Amendment, in order to
receive the federal assistance at issue. 3 The Court acknowledged
that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected.. .freedom of speech
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit."' The Government
asserted that because the libraries are themselves public entities,
they do not possess First Amendment rights and therefore this
claim necessarily fails.65 The Court avoided addressing whether
public libraries in fact have First Amendment rights, because the
Court concluded that even if the libraries can bring an
"unconstitutional conditions" claim, it would fail on the merits.66
The Court rejected the Appellees' "unconstitutional conditions"
claim because it concluded that Congress' enactment of CIPA does
not deny the libraries a benefit.67 CIPA's amendments to the Erate and LSTA programs merely require that the federal assistance
doled out be used for the purposes for which it is intended.68 The
Court reasoned that the E-rate and LSTA programs were originally
intended to provide the financial resources to assist libraries in
acquiring quality material that is of interest to and appropriate for
their communities.69 While the subsidies were designed to add to
the libraries' collections via the Internet, they did not alter the
62. Id. at210.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Board of Comm'rs, Wabansee City. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
674 (1996), quoting Perry v. Snidermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
65. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 210.
66. Id.
67. Id. at211.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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underlying intent of the programs in fitting with the libraries'
traditional role within the community." Emphasizing the broad
power Congress possesses to place conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, the Court found support in Rust v. Sullivan,
providing that "when the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program."'" In Rust, Congress appropriated funds for family
planning but excluded programs that provided abortion counseling
from receiving those funds.72 The Court held that Congress did not
place an unconstitutional condition on the funds because it merely
defined the limits of the program for which it appropriated funds
and did not deny a benefit to anyone.73 Therefore, the Court
concluded that, as in Rust, the funds appropriated in the instant
case did not unconstitutionally condition public libraries to forego
their First Amendment right to provide constitutionally protected
speech in order to receive federal assistance.74
IV. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's final
judgment that held CIPA to be facially unconstitutional. While the
Supreme Court addressed the libraries' claims that CIPA violated
the First Amendment's protection of free speech and that it placed
an unconstitutional condition on public libraries, the Court placed
the majority of its attention and analysis on the former claim. In
its review of whether CIPA violated the First Amendment, the
Court focused on the role of libraries within our society, and in the
end, held that public libraries' traditional role necessitates that they
have broad discretion to make content-based judgments regarding
the selection of material available, both in the stacks and on the
70. Id.
71. Am. Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 194 (1991)).
72. Id. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 178).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Internet. The Court ultimately concluded that Internet access
provided by public libraries did not rise to the level of a public
forum. Therefore, the content-based restrictions imposed by CIPA
are in harmony with libraries' traditional role and do not violate
the First Amendment. Similarly, the Court based Appellees'
"unconstitutional conditions" claim on the role of the library
within society, holding that Congress was within its authority to
define the limits of the programs to which it appropriates funds.
Thus, Appellees' victory in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
turned to defeat in front of the United States Supreme Court and
CIPA still stands.
Ashley Young
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